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CONCLUSION

In the past 30 to 40 years, the Board has attempted to lay down
guidelines for both management and unions to adhere to in conducting
themselves during a representation election. The Board has recognized
the far-reaching impact of a representation election in that it can effect the
relations between workers and management for many years to come. In
furthering a policy of giving the voters a fair and free choice at the polls,
the Board in supervising these elections will allow only a certain type of
conduct. The Board's task is to set forth guidelines to be followed. Furthermore, by lawing down these guidelines, the Board offers the parties to an
election a system under which they can operate legitimately without risking
objections being filed that would lengthen the process of choosing a representative. It is not to either side's advantage to conduct themselves in
such a way so as to come under the Board's scrutiny and thereby create
an atmosphere of dissension while waiting for the Board's decision as to
alleged objections. The more advantageous course to follow is to conduct
the election under the Board's guidelines and to have the election results
certified immediately after the election.
JOHN D. FRISBY, JR.

THE BUYING AND SELLING OF HUMAN ORGANS
FROM THE LIVING:
WHY NOT?
I.

INTRODUCTION

T

ins ARTICLE will examine the propriety of establishing a system for
the sale of human organs, especially the kidney. Initially, the debilitating malady of end stage renal disease will be discussed as will the marginal
"cure" of the disease via hemodialysis. Next, the superior alternative to
dialysis, i.e., kidney transplantation will be discussed in two ways. First,
the current procedure of using living, related donors will be examined
as well as harvesting kidneys from cadaver "donors". Second, the practice
of transplantation will be explored for its ramifications to society and the
participants in the following areas: medicine, psychology, and the law.
As will be shown, the recipient, donor and the physician are affected by
the legal aspects of transplantation in many ways.
Then, the scarcity of the availability of life-saving organs under the
current procedures will be discussed. Next, a new alternative to current
practice, i.e., the sale of kidneys, will be considered as a solution to the
scarcity
problem. As was
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posed practice will be explored in two ways. First, the procedural aspects
of such a course of action will be examined. Second, the effect of sales on
society and the participants in the medical, psychological, legal, and in
addition, ethical and economical dimensions will be analyzed and compared to the earlier discussion of the current procedures. Finally, a concluding statement will espouse the establishment of a regulated system
for the sale of kidneys as the best method of saving the lives of those who
are in danger today for the lack of a kidney.
The kidney has been chosen as the representative organ for a discussion on the sale of human body parts for one primary reason. It is the
only transplantable organ, essential to life, that can be removed from
another to save that life with very little effect on the provider.' Organs such
as the heart and liver are essential to life but can not be removed from a
live provider,2 while organs such as the cornea are not essential to maintain
life. Therefore, the kidney is the most vital organ that can be easily sold
by a living individual.
One final point needs to be made about the scope of this comment.
Discussion in this entire article will focus primarily on the donation and sale
of kidneys from individuals who are living. Numerous articles' have adequately considered the legal, ethical and medical dimensions peculiar to
cadaveric transplantation. Therefore, discussion of cadaver transplants and
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act will be limited throughout this article.
II. END STAGE RENAL DISEASE (ESRD) AND DIALYSIS
End Stage renal disease (ESRD) is chronic, permanent, irreversible
damage to both kidneys. As a result the body does not excrete water, salt
and other waste materials. If the disease remains untreated, death is imminent. Sixty thousand deaths occur in the United States every year from
complications arising from ESRD."
However, death due to ESRD can be prevented by hemodialysis, a
process in which the patient's blood is filtered and cleansed through an
I Bone

marrow transplantation can be life-saving and is said to have very little effect on

the donor. However, sale of bone marrow tissue is not indicated because most potential

providers in a sales situation would be unrelated to the recipient. "Random, unrelated donors
are of no value to the patient." Dr. Louis Pietragallo, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 27,
1978, at 4, col. 3.
RPv. 811, 850-51
2 Dukeminier, Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. L.

(1970) [hereinafter cited as Dukeminier].
s See, e.g., Louisell, Procurement of Organs for Transplantation, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 607
(1969); Richards, Medical-Legal Problems of Organ Transplantation, 21 HASTINGs L.J. 77
(1969); Arnet, The Criteria for Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants-A MedicoLegal Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220 (1973); Stewart, Human Organ Transplantation-The
Medical Miracle and the Legal Maze, 20 S.C. L. REv. 419 (1968); Note, Scarce Medical

Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1969);

P. Simmons, Kidney Transplantation in

ed. 1973) at 165.
'What Everyone Should Know About Kidneys and Kidney Diseases (Channing
Co., Inc., Greenfield, Mass. 1976 ed.).
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/8
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artificial kidney machine. Unfortunately, this treatment, although life-saving,
is very debilitating to the 15,000 people in the United States currently
receiving dialysis.' First of all, dialysis patients must come into a treatment
center two or three times a week for dialysis lasting 3 -5 hours6 in order
to stay alive. Often this involves traveling many miles to the center. The
time involved with dialysis plus the debilitating effects of the illness prohibits the majority of patients from maintaining a job, even if the patient
can be dialyzed at home.' The patient must have an operation to join a
vein and artery in the forearm, where the patient is hooked to the machine
during dialysis. This operation leaves a very noticeable scar.'
Furthermore, dialysis patients are told to follow a complex and trying
diet regimen which restricts foods containing protein, sodium and potassium.
The intake of fluids often must be curbed." Patients usually feel fatigued
due to anemia and a phenomenon called "dialysis hangover"."
Most patients must take nine to 12 large capsules of phosphate-binding
pills daily as well as vitamins, drugs to reduce blood pressure, and other
medications. 1 Sexually, a combination of psychological and physiological
factors may produce impotence in men, while women, who are less likely
to lose sexual function, worry about their desireability as a sexual partner
due to physical changes such as hair loss and yellowish skin. Consequently,
marriages may falter under the stress.1 2
Psychologically, the dialysis patient may have periods of confusion,
disorientation, difficulty in concentration, impaired memory, hallucinations
and difficulty in thinking, speaking and making himself understood. Such
changes may arise from a dialysis-induced organic brain syndrome.1 Sometimes a few dialysis patients become so depressed that they attempt or
commit suicide, frequently through the covert method of non-compliance
with dietary restrictions.' Others decide that all these changes are not
5 Moore, Psychiatric Aspects of Chronic Renal Disease, 60, No. 5 POSTGRADUATE MED. 140
(Nov. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Moore].
I Everything (almost) You Ever Wanted to Know About Dialysis and Were Afraid to
Ask (P. Hartman ed. 1976) (unpublished handbook of Akron City Hospital).
7 Moore, supra note 5.
aId.
9 Hartman & Becker, Non-Compliance with Prescribed Regimen Among Chronic Hemodialysis Patients, 7 DIALYSIS & TRANSPLANTATION 978 (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter cited as

Hartman & Becker].
'l Interview with Paula E. Hartman, M.A., Former Renal Counselor, Akron City Hospital
Dialysis Unit (March 29, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Hartman interview].
11 Hartman & Becker, supra note 9.
12 Moore, supra note 5 at 142.
13 Collins, Emotional Problems of Dialysis and Transplant Patients 8 (Virgil Smirnow
Associates, Washington, D.C. 1977).
14 Abrams, Moore & Westervelt, Suicidal Behavior in Chronic Dialysis Patients, 127 AM. J.
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
1980
PsycATRY
1119 (1971).
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worthwhile and withdraw from treatment, dying shortly thereafter from
uremic poisoning.1"
Finally, dialysis is not a sure method of escaping death. It has been
of dialysis patients are still living after 5 years
estimated that only
of treatment." Dialysis, therefore, may be just a method of delaying imminent death. In summary, "the chronic renal patient is a marginal man...
in that he is suspended in a state of limbo between the world of the sick
1
and the world of the well, belonging to neither, yet a part of both."
Fortunately, though, most of the hardships of dialysis, including eventual death, can be avoided by the alternative of kidney transplantation. The
bulk of the remainder of this article considers the transplantation alternative,
especially with respect to kidney providers who are living when they donate
their kidney.

III.
A.

THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF KIDNEY TRANSPLANT DONATION

Proceduresof Kidney Removal and Transplantation

1. Introduction
The first successful kidney transplant was performed on December
23, 1954 in Boston's Peter Bent Brigham Hospital between living identical
twins. 8 Transplants using cadaver kidneys had already begun two years
earlier. 9 Between 1963 and June 1976, a total of 25,108 reported kidney
transplants have been undertaken.2" Of those patients transplanted, 68%
1
are still alive, two thirds (45%) of whom have a functioning transplant.
Of the patients who are dead (32%), two thirds (20.5%) died with a
functioning kidney.22 Therefore, 89% of those who received kidney transplants between 1963 and 1976 are either alive today or had died with
a functioning kidney. Two main types of sources have served as the kidney
donors for these transplants-cadavers (75%) and living donors related
to the recipient (25 % ) .1
15 G. Schreiner, Problems of Ethics in Relation to Haemodialysis and Transplantation, in

LAW & ETHics OF TRANSPLANTATION, 126 at 129 (G. Wolstenholme and M. O'Connor
ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as TRANSPLANTATiON LAW & ETmcs].
16 Baron, Botsford & Cole, Live Organ and Tissue Transplants From Minor Donors in

Massachusetts, 55 B.U.L. REv. 159, 163 [hereinafter cited as Baron, Botsford & Cole].
17 Landsman, The Patient with Chronic Renal Failure: A Marginal Man, 82 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 268 (1975).
isBennett & Harrison, Experience with Living Familial Renal Donors, 139 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bennett & Harrison].

19Id.

Thirteenth Report of the Human Renal Transplant Registry, American College of Surgeons/
National Institutes of Health Organ Transplant Registry 1 (unpublished 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Renal Transplant Report].
21 Id. at 2.
20

22 Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/8
2s Id.at 6.
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2. Important Factors in the Removal and Allocation of Kidneys
There are three important interrelated factors to consider in the removal and allocation of kidneys-matching, time and the pre-transplant
health of the donor. Matching is the process in which the tissue of the
donor is tested to determine which recipient will be best-suited to receive
the transplant. The better a match is, the less likely the kidney will be
rejected by the recipient's immunological system which protects the patient
from disease and foreign objects, such as the new kidney."4
The second factor, time, is critical in transplantation, especially with
cadaveric kidneys. Kidneys must be transplanted quickly 5 since they deteriorate for lack of oxygen as soon as the heartbeat of the cadaver stops."
The third factor is the pre-transplant health of the donor. If the
cadaver donor has had any trauma to the kidney, either due to the cause
of death or a disease, such as cancer, transmissable diseases, renal disease
or hypertension," that existed before death, the kidneys will not be used.
These latter complications also negate the use of a living related donor.
Sometimes, psychological trauma in the living donor will cause a transplant
team to conclude that removal should not occur. The psychological effects
of the transplant to both donor and recipient will be discussed later.
Allocation of cadaveric organs are usually made locally, 8 due to
time restraints and economic factors.2 " However, there are regional and
national computer lists of waiting transplant recipients who are occasionally
accommodated when local potential recipients are poor-risk candidates
for transplant. New innovations in a device called a kidney perfusion machine, which allows transplants up to 48-72 hours after removal since it
minimizes kidney deterioration, makes such transplants possible.' Even
so, the general rule is that all other factors being even, the longer the kidney
Interview with Hayes H. Davis, M.D., Chief of Nephrology, Akron City Hospital, Akron,
Ohio (March 15, 1979).
24

de Stoop, Law in Australia Relating to the Transplantationof Organs from Cadavers, 48
Ausm. L.J. 21, 26 (1974).
2
6 Arnet, The Criteria for Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants-A Medico-Legal
Dilemma, 38 Mo. L. REv. 220, 224 (1973).
25

Protocol for Kidney Retrieval: A manual of the Northeastern Ohio Organ Recovery
Program 3 (Transplantation Society of Northeastern Ohio, Inc. 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Recovery manual].
28 Address by Blech, Buszta, Williams & Zachary, Recovery, Preservation, Tissue Typing,
and Transplantation of Cadaveric Kidneys, Third Renal Symposium, Cleveland, Ohio
(March 4, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Blech address]. Of recent transplants done in the
northeastern Ohio area, 83 % of the kidneys were removed in northeastern Ohio hospitals.
Id.
27

29

It is estimated that the cost of transporting a kidney out of the state is $5,000 to $6,000.

Id.
so Reidell, Dilemma for Patient and Physician: 'Brother, can you spare a kidney?', 45 No. 6

MOD, by
MED,
46, 50 (March 15,1980
1977) [hereinafter cited as Reidell].
Published
IdeaExchange@UAkron,

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 8
Summer, 1979]

CO~MEN

is perfused after removal, the less likelihood that it will result in a functioning transplant.
3. Kidney Removal and Transplantation
Cadaveric "donors" are taken to a hospital as soon as possible and
both kidneys are removed by a transplant surgeon in about thirty minutes.
However, storage of the kidneys in a perfusion machine is necessary, usually
for an average of 24 hours 1 so that matching tests can be conducted to
find suitable recipients.
hours.12 No perfusion of
For living donors, the operation takes 2
the kidney is usually necessary since the donor and recipient are side by
side on the operating table." Most often, the left kidney is used since it
is easier to remove from the donor and fits more easily into the recipient.3 "
The transplant operation itself lasts 5 to 6 hours.3
B.

Ramifications of Kidney Transplantsfrom Living Donors

1. Medical Ramifications of Living Donor Transplants
a. Introduction
There is no doubt today that kidney transplantation is a medically accepted therapy for ESRD and therefore cannot be regarded as a form of experimentation on humans."' Transplant operations offer the greatest likelihood
of prolonging the life of the recipient without unduly threatening the wellbeing of the donor."
b. Medical Changes in the Recipient
In addition to saving life, a kidney transplant allows the individual
to leave his existence as a "marginal man" and become a normal functioning
individual once again.
However, critics' of living donor use say the risk of using living
donors is not justified since there is no guarantee of transplant function
or patient survival over an extended period of time. However, 70% of
kidneys from living related donors (parents and siblings) are still functioning in the recipient one year after transplant and over 60% are still working
Blech address, supra note 28.
2 Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 374, 289 A.2d 386, 389 (Super. Ct. 1972).

31
3

sa Bennett & Harrison, supra note 18 at 895.
$4d.
at 896.
35 Blech address, supra note 28.
36 29 Conn. Supp. at 376, 289 A.2d at 390; Felner & Marshall, Kidney Donor-The Myth
of Informed Consent, 126 AM. J. PsYcHIATRY 1245 (1970); Moore, Cardiacand Other Organ

Transplantation, 206 J.A.M.A. 2489, 2491 (1968); Jeddeloh & Chatterjee, Legal Problems
in Organ Donation, 58 SuRoIcAL CLtNics N. AMERICA 245 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as

Jeddeloh & Chatterjeel.
87 Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra note 16.
38 Stewart, Human Organ Transplantation-The Medical Miracle and the Legal Maze, 20
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/8
S.C. L. REv. 419, 421 (1968).
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after five years.3 " One study reports that children who receive a relative's
kidney have a 68% success rate of kidney functioning after five years."0
These figures compare very favorably against those who receive cadaver
kidneys where only 46% function for a year and 35% function after five
years. " Moreover, one year after transplant, 86% of recipients who have
a relative's kidney are still living; this figure drops to only 76% after five
years.' In children, 78% are still surviving five years after a transplant
from a living related donor. " Again, these figures should be compared
with figures of 72% and 51% for one and five year survival rates, respectively, for cadaver kidney recipients." It is also to be remembered that
only 50% of dialysis patients are still living after five years on the machine.'
Transplant recipients also have some unpleasant side effects which
occur primarily due to the necessary ingestion of immunosuppressant drugs
to ward off rejection of the new organ. Common side effects are bone
marrow toxicity, liver damage, a roundish face, a small hump on the back
of the neck, " and increased susceptibility to infection. "7 Occasionally,
bones will deteriorate and peptic ulcers and cataracts will form. "
However, all things considered, it is apparent that the recipient's
chances of survival when a kidney is received from a living source greatly
outweighs adverse side effects and the results that can be expected from
cadaver sources. Moreover, the opportunity for a longer period of improved
quality of life is a much more substantial possibility for recipients from
living sources, than for those who receive cadaver kidneys or those who
are maintained on dialysis.
c. Medical Risk to the Living Donor
An individual with two functioning kidneys has four times as much
kidney tissue as is necessary to adequately cleanse the blood and perform
other vital functions. 9 Therefore, one kidney can be thought of as a "spare"
organ that can be made available for a transplant.
The risks to the transplant donor are primarily two-fold, the risk of
the operation itself and the possibility of failure of the remaining kidney in
39
40

Renal Transplant Report, supra note 20 at 6.
Fine, Long-Term Results of Renal Transplantation in Children, 61

PEDIATRICS

641 (1978)

[hereinafter cited as Fine].
41 Renal Transplant Report, supra note 20 at 7.
42 Id. at 7.
48 Fine, supra note 45.
4,Renal
Transplant Report, supra note 20 at 7.
5 Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra note 16.
" 29 Conn. Supp. at 373, 289 A.2d at 389.
47 Blech address, supra note 25.
48 29 Conn. Supp. at 373, 289 A.2d at 389.
'9 Sharpe, The Minor Transplant Donor, 7 OTrAwA L. REv. 85, 92 (1975)
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the future. The risk of the operation itself is attendant to the use of general
anesthesia. It is estimated that the risk of death due to the operation is
5
.05% ;5° only five donors have died from thousands used. " The operation
3
hours52 and the average stay in the hospital is 8 days. The
lasts 2
5"
donor is able to engage in normal activities after 30 days. One study"
reported that major postoperative complications, such as wound infection
and pneumonia occur in 4% of the cases while minor postoperative complications such as urinary retention and fever arise in another 24% of
the donors. However, most of these complications disappear in a few days
and many of them were attributed to the use of donors with chronic pulmonary disease.5"
The second risk, that of the failure of the remaining kidney, is said
to be .07% Y Normally, the only worry is that some sort of trauma will
cause the remaining kidney to malfunction. However, it was reported in
1975 that in over 20 years of renal transplantation there never had been
a reported case of total renal failure in a donor.5" The five year life expectancy of a 35 year old male donor is 99.1% compared to a non-donor
figure of 99.3%; consequently, most insurance companies do not raise
their premiums for individuals who have had one kidney removed.5 9
Therefore, it can be seen that from a medical standpoint, donating a
kidney is a very low-risk procedure. When the discomfort of a kidney donor
is compared to the life-saving potential of the gift to the recipient, it can
be seen why living donors are used for transplantation.
2. Legal Ramifications of Living Donor Transplants
a. Introduction
Three parties are present in any transplantation from a living donorthe recipient, the donor and the physician or surgeon. The following discussion will attempt to analyze the legal relationships among these parties.
Before beginning, it is necessary to note that the donation of a kidney from
a living donor is not prohibited by any law of any state or by federal law."
Hamburger, in Discussion to Woodruff, Transplantation: The Clinical Problem, in

50

TRANS-

PLANTATION LAW & ETmcs, supra note 15, 6 at 20.
51 Bennett & Harrison, supra note 18; Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra note 16 at 164.
52 29
53

Conn. Supp. at 374, 289 A.2d at 389.

Bennett & Harrison, supra note 18 at 897.

54

29 Conn. Supp. at 374, 289 A.2d at 389.

55 Bennett & Harrison, supra note 18 at 896.

54 Id. at 897.
57 Hamburger, in Discussion to Woodruff, Transplantation: The Clinical Problem, in TPANsPLANTATION LAW

& ETmcs, supra note 15, 6 at 20.

58

Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra note 16 at 164.
59 Santiago, Life Insurance Perspectives for the Living Kidney Donor, 14 TRANSPLANTATION

131 (1976).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/8
" Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 850.
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b. Legal Standing of the Parties
It appears that in a purely donative situation free of coercion, neither
the recipient or donor would have a cause of action against one another.
However, the recipient might have a basis for suit against the physician or
surgeon if the latter did not fully inform him of the risks of transplantation
and the potential success of the operation to which the understanding
recipient acknowledged his consent.61 In other words, the recipient must
give his informed consent to the operation. In addition, should the surgeon
or physician perform the operation in a negligent manner, he could be
liable to the recipient for medical malpractice."2
Most of the controve.rsy in this area, however, has focused on the
legal position of the donor in four ways. The first concern is whether a
donor who is related to the recipient can really give "informed consent" to
the removal of his kidney."3 It is possible that pressure from family members
can be so great that is it questionable whether the requisite "consent" is
present.
The second issue concerns the information that the surgeon or physician
must give the donor so as not to be subject to civil liability for assault and
battery or wrongful death, should death occur. The surgeon or physician
must not minimize the dangers of the surgical procedure, nor withhold any
facts necessary for the donor to form an intelligent consent,"4 such as the
fact that the transplant may not be successful."5 Therefore, if as a result of
is explanation to the (adult) donor, the donor understands the nature
of the procedure, and voluntarily consents to removal of the kidney for
transplantation, the surgeon or the physician is not normally subject to
civil liability. One source concludes,
81 Louisell, Transplantation: Existing Legal Constraints, in TRANSPLANTATION LAW & Evmcs,
supra note 15, 78 at 80.
62
However, Jeddeloh & Chatterjee, supra note 36 at 246-247 suggest that transplant surgeons
have not been sued by recipients for three reasons; 1) there is no recognized standard of

care in kidney transplantation since the procedure is relatively new; 2) most recipients
realize that success is not assured; and 3) a careful personal relationship usually develops
between the patient and the surgeon.
63 Sharpe, supra note 49 at 104.
64 Louisell, Transplantation:Existing Legal Constraints, in TRANSPLANTATION LAW & ETHics,
supra note 15, 78 at 80.
65 Woodruff, Transplantation: The Clinical Problem in TRANSPLANTATION LAW & ETmcs,
supra note 15, 6 at 11.
0
6 Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 850. There have been no cases in which consenting adults
subsequently have argued that the consent was invalid and have sued the surgeon for removing the kidney. Id. at 851. A good example of a consent form has been reprinted in Castel,
Some Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation in Canada, 46 CAN. B. REv. 345
(1968). It states:
Doctor
has explained to me that the life of
is endangered due to irreversible kidney disease . . . . The immediate risks of the operation for removal of my
kidney, as well as the possible future permanent injury to my health suffered as a

direct result of the removal of my kidney have been fully explained to me. I am also

Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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of the possibility that
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[T]he physician and transplant center are practically immune from
civil liability for activities relating to organ transplantation, unless
there is a clear showing of an extreme departure from professional
standards of due care.4
Two state statutes concur with this conclusion."
The third legal concern is the use of non-adult donors, i.e., minors
and incompetents such as the mentally retarded, for transplantation. In British
Columbia, a minor who is 19 can give an informed consent to kidney
removal provided the consent is free of all coercion. 9 In Michigan, an
incompetent or a minor of 14 years of age can consent to kidney removal
upon the application of any interested party provided there is a showing
that the minor understands the needs of the recipient and the consequences
to both himself and the donee."' With minors who are younger, and therefore with very limited ability to "consent", courts have groped for a rationalization to allow such transplants. Primarily, the courts have delineated
two reasons for authorizing these transplants: 1) the doctrine of substituted
judgment; and 2) the existence of emotional benefit to the donor. In the
classic case of Strunk v. Strunk,"' an incompetent's parents sought to transplant his kidney into their dying normal son. The court allowed the transplant noting that all the members of his family, the Department of Mental
Health and both the county and circuit courts gave their approval to the
transplant (i.e. substituted consent). 7 Furthermore, the court held that it
would be disturbing blow to the incompetent if his brother were to die
since the normal brother often visited the incompetent. Therefore, it was
important to the incompetent's emotional well-being to keep his brother
alive. 3 In Hart v. Brown,' the court authorized a transplant between two
twins, seven years of age. The court held that the children's parents would
I nevertheless wish and do request, authorize and direct
In an effort to benefit
to remove one of my kidneys by means of surgical operation in order
Doctor that this kidney may be transplanted into
Id. at 368. Also the form is to be signed by a witness who acknowledges that the donor
read the statement in his presence, and understands it and the risks and consequences inherent in the procedure. Id.
67

Shapiro, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Organ Transplants, 50 CH.-KENT L. REv. 510,

525 (1973).
68

ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 181-84 (Smith-Hurd 1971) indicates that it is "important to
the health and welfare of the people of this state" that organs be made available for transplantation. Id., § 181. As long as the physician exercises due care and professional standards
of care in providing services according to the current state of medical arts, he would only be
liable for negligence or willful misconduct. Id., § 181 and § 183. MICH. COMP. LAws § 691.1511
(Supp. 1977) also only provides for physician liability in transportation for negligence or
willful misconduct.
69 B.C. REv. STAT. ch. 37 (1972).
70 MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 701.19(a) and (b) (Supp. 1972).
71445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
72

Id. at 147.

Id. at 146.
7429 Conn. Supp. 368, 289 A.2d 386.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/8
73
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be able to substitute their consent for their children's only after a close,
independent and objective investigation of their motivation and reasoning."'
However, the court in In re Guardianship of Pescinski,6 ' disallowed
a transplant holding that there was no evidence whatsoever that a 39 year
old catatonic schizophrenic would receive any benefit from a transplant to
his sister. Even though the family wanted the transplant to be performed
since it would have saved the life of a mother of six, the court recognized
that the incompetent was incapable of giving consent. Furthermore, his
guardian ad litem was opposed to the transplant and there was no showing
that the incompetent was supported in any way by his sister."
Some commentators"8 agree with the latter of the three cases and feel
that the use of living minors and incompetents for transplantation should
be prohibited since the theories authorizing such transplants in the past
have been mere rationalizations. The ability of the courts to allow such
transplants as within their equity powers has also been questioned. 9 Perhaps
the best solution is to apply a test formulated by Justice Day in his dissent
to In re Guardianship of Pescinskis He feels that a transplant from an
incompetent or minor is not permissible unless: 1) the donee will die
without it; 2) reasonable steps to secure a transplant from another source
have been made, but failed; 3) the minor and recipient are related so as
to infer that if the minor were competent, he would most probably consent
to the procedure; 4) the donor is in good health; and 5) there is a minimal
risk to the donor and a showing that he could function with only one
kidney. 1 In addition, no transplants should be permitted using minors or
incompetents without appointment of a guardian ad litem and a demonstration of the real reasons behind the consent by other family members."
The final legal problem in relation to the living kidney donor is the
use of prisoners as donors. In one study, prisoners from three state prisons
in Denver were used as donors.8 3 No compensation was involved and no
reduction in the prisoner's sentences was offered. The donors volunteered
via a notice on a bulletin board at the prisons. Even though there was a
feeling that the actions of these particular convicts were truly volitional, 8'
75
71

Id. at 375, 289 A.2d at 391.
67 Wis.2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975).

77 Id.
78

Sharpe, supra note 49 at 98; Jeddeloh & Chatterjee, supra note 40 at 254.

79 However, MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 701.19(a) and (b)

(Supp. 1972), give the probate

court this power.
80 67 Wis.2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975).
81 Id. at 10, 226 N.W.2d at 183 (1975) (Day, J., dissenting).
82 29 Conn. Supp. at 375, 289 A.2d at 391.
83 Starzl, in Discussion to Murray, Organ Transplantation: The Practical Possibilities, in
TRANSPLA ITATION LAW & ETHIcs, supra, note 15, 54 at 75.
84 Id. at 76.
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it was decided by a group of leaders in the transplantation field that further
use of penal volunteers would inevitably lead to abuse if the practice
were accepted and applied broadly. 5 The major factor in the decision was
the rationale that a person held under restraint could not be presumed to
6
consent.1
One final area in the use of living donors for kidney transplants needs
to be explored. Are transplant surgeons criminally liable for their actions?
Arguably, the surgeon could be charged with assault, mayhem and even
murder. In all three situations consent by the "victim" is no defense to the
crime and a justification argument would have to be advanced.8" However,
the state would seem to have an insurmountable burden to demonstrate
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The touching in a transplant setting is
definitely not meant to inflict serious harm. 8 It would also be difficult for
a prosecutor to intimate that transplantation involves mayhem, i.e., a
willful, malicious and permanent disfigurement or disablement of the body
accompanied by breaking of the skin. 8 Transplantation is in no way comparable to the mayhem that occurred in State v. Bass ° where a physician
twice injected two different individuals with anesthesia so that they could
amputate their fingers to collect insurance benefits. The all important requisite of medical benefit exists in the transplantation situation and should
immunize the surgeon from any criminal liability.
3. Psychological Ramifications of Living Donor Transplants
a. Effects on the Recipient
The primary psychological changes in the recipient are overwhelmingly
favorable should the transplant be successful. Since the patient has a new
lease on life,9 ' the only worries should be the possibility of future kidney
failure and the side effects of the immunosuppressant drugs.82 Even if the
transplant fails, the patient's depression should be alleviated by the realizaion that he can still be maintained by dialysis until a second opportunity
for a transplant becomes available. Although it was once thought that
recipients who rejected a kidney previously became "immunized" against
transplants, a recent study has shown that rates of success for a second
85 Id. at 76-77.
88 Daube in Final Discussion to Transplantation: Acceptability of Procedures and the
Required Legal Sanctions, in TRANSPLANTATION LAW & ETmIcs, supra note 15, 188 at 204.
87 Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 855.
88
Note, Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MIcH. L. REv. 1182, 1238 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Body Part Sales].

89 Id. at 1239.
90 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580 (1961). For an extensive discussion of mayhem, see pages
44-50 of the official reporter opinion.
91 Murray, Organ Transplantation: The Practical Possibilities, in TRANSPLANTATION LAW &
ETHICS, supra note 15, 54 at 61.

92 See text accompanying notes 47-48, supra.
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transplant are only slightly lower than first transplant success rates.13 It
is only necessary that care be taken to assure that the match of the second
donor is not identical to that of the first rejected kidney.9"
b. Effects on the Donor
Before living relatives are accepted as transplantation donors, psychological evaluations are routinely given to determine the mental stability
of the potential donor and the amount of pressure he is experiencing from
other members of his family to submit the "donations."9 In one transplant
center in Paris, 40% of the potential donors were eliminated from consideration due to the donor's lack of stability and/or the existence of
coercion upon him. So as to avoid scorn by other members of the family
should this individual be a suitable match, the individual and his family
are told that he was a poor match.9" Often potential donors opt out since
they may fear the operation, losing a body part, developing kidney disease
and thinking that the procedure may cause the death of the recipient or
the rejection of the organ. 8
On the other hand, it has been reported that some family members
fight among themselves to see who will be the "lucky" one to donate their
kidney. 9 A decision to donate is often internally made before the physician
informs the donor of the risks of the procedure.' 0 After the operation, although the donors sometime experience mild postoperative depression, it
is short-lived. In fact, most donors felt that the procedure was one of the
most rewarding experiences of their lives and they would not hesitate to
do it again.' Donors would receive notoriety as heroes for their generosity
and they felt increased self-esteem for having done something valuable
10 2
in their lifetime, often, to save the life of another.
Some of the psychological factors mentioned above effect the ability
93 Opelz & Terasaki, Absence of Immunization Effect in Human Kidney Retransplantation,
299 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 371 (1978).
94 Blech address, supra note 28.
95
Hamburger, in Discussion to Woodruff, Transplantation: The Clinical Problem, in TRANSPLANTATION LAW

& ETIcs, supra note 15, 6 at 14.

- Id. Other examples of articles which discuss the coercive factors found between family
members are: Reidell, supra note 34; Eisendrath, Guttmann & Murray, Psychologic Considerations in the Selection of Kidney Transplant Donors, 129 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OBsTETRIcs 243 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Eisendrath]; Simmons, Hickey, Kjellstrand &
Simmons, Family Tension in the Search for a Kidney Donor, 215 J.A.M.A. 909 (1971);
Kemph, Psychotherapy with Patients Receiving Kidney Transplant, 124 J. AM. PSYCH. 623
(1967).
97 Id.
98 Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra note 16, at 164.
99 Fellner & Marshall, Kidney Donor-The Myth of Informed Consent, 126 AM. J. PSYCH.
1245, 1248 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Fellner & Marshall].
00
Id. at 1247.
101 Eisendrath, supra note 101 at 246.
102 Id.
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of the potential donor to make an informed consent. As discussed earlier,
powerful coercive pressure may be placed on the individual by his family
to donate irrespective of his own concern of the risks involved. On the
other hand, individuals who decide to donate before they even learn
of the potential dangers have certainly consented but obviously without
knowledge. Hopefully, good psychological evaluation and good physicianpatient communication will eliminate these types of donors.
In the final analysis, once it is clear that an informed consent is
given, it is almost certain that a kidney donor, although possibly under a great
deal of stress initially by his family to make a donation to save a family
member, is nevertheless emotionally uplifted by his act of heroism.
IV.

THE SCARCITY OF KIDNEYS FOR TRANSPLANTATION

Introduction
Dr. Woodruff foretold in 1966 that the shortage of kidneys was a
major limitation in the use of organ transplants and that before long it
would become the dominant drawback.' Time has borne out his prediction.
It is estimated that only one of every ten patients per year gets a needed
Furthermore, the number of dialysis patients is exkidney transplant.'
pected to increase threefold from 15,000 today to 45,000 in the mid
1980's." ' Many of these patients will become potential transplant recipients.
In Ohio alone, there are 250 people on a kidney transplant waiting list."'
A.

The Scarcity of CadaverOrgans
In some areas of the country, it takes four to five years to get a
cadaver kidney for transplant.' 7 At that rate, 50% of the potential re0 8 The Unicipients will have died before they could receive a transplant.
form Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), which has been passed in all 50
states, was supposed to be the primary source of kidney transplants.
However, it is clear that reliance on the UAGA to supply kidneys for
transplantation is not warranted. Recently, of one hundred cadavers used
for kidney transplants in Gainesville, Florida, not one was carrying a donor
card. 09 Even more disconcerting is the practice of the Northeastern Ohio
0
Organ Recovery Program. In their manual" they require the physician
at the scene of death to have the next-of-kin sign a consent form even

B.

ao0Woodruff, Transplantation: The Clinical Problem, in TRANSPLANTATION LAW & ETHIcs,
supra note 15, 6 at 10.
104 Weissman, Why the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act Has Failed, 116 TR. & EST. 264, 265

(1977)

[hereinafter cited as Weissman].

105 Id.

Blech address, supra note 28.
Stetler, Kidney Donation from Minors and Incompetents, 35 LA. L. Rv. 551 (1975).
108 Baron, Botsford & Cole, supra note 16.
109 Weissman, supra note 104.

106

107

manual, supra note 27 at 4.

110 Recovery
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though the donor has properly completed a Uniform Donor Card. Under
the UAGA, once a donor has signed this card disposing of his body or
a part thereof, the wishes of the next-of-kin can not supersede that "bequest".
One of the purposes of the UAGA was to preserve precious time to minimize
deterioriation of the organ. This purpose is sabotaged by such practices
of organ recovery programs. Another recent disappointing development is
the fact that organ donation centers reported a sharp decrease in the
number of donated cadaver organs for the first six months of 1978 as
compared with the first six months of 1977.1' Even before that, the number
of transplants that have been performed in the 1970's has remained rather
steady" 2 despite the increasing numbers of potential recipients. Eleven
years ago it was said:
All evidence indicates that the act [UAGA] will not relieve the shortage of free cadaver organs to any appreciable extent and that thousands
of people will continue to die because of lack of a needed organ.
The Act is a placebo, easily swallowed, but not a remedy.1 '
Today, it is certain that:
The UAGA has thus far been a failure and may never fulfill earlier
expectations by creating an adequate supply of human body parts.
1 14
It is clear that the time to consider alternatives to the UAGA is-now.
C.

Possible Alternatives
Many alternatives have been postulated to provide enough essential organs for transplant. One of them, organ banks, is not feasible in kidney transplantation today since kidneys must be transplanted within 72 hours of death.
Also, forced "donation" is not permissable. In the case of McFall v.
Shimp," ' a man dying of a bone marrow disease brought a suit to compel
his cousin to donate his marrow. The court dismissed the suit and said:
For a society which respects the right of one individual to sink its
teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members, and suck
from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hardwrought concepts of jurisprudence."'
The use of incompetents, minors and prisoners has been discussed earlier.",
It is apparent that none of these potential resources could be tapped due

III Akron

Beacon Journal, July 13, 1978, at DI,
"Coma", which depicts a blackmarket operation for
partly responsible for this trend. This film was based
R. CooK, COMA (1977).
112 Renal Transplant Report, supra note 20 at 6-7.
113 Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 866.
114 Weissman, supra note 104 at 282.
"25 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, July 27, 1978, at 1, col.

col. 5-6. It is suggested that the film,
providing organs for transplant, may be
on a novel by Robin Cook, a physician.

3.

216 Id. at 4, col. 5.
7

11

See text accompanying notes 69-86, supra.
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to inherent difficulties in obtaining consent and the court's and state's
duty to look out for the benefit of its wards and children.
8
Compulsory removal of organs at death has also been suggested."
It is currently being practiced in France where there is much furor over
the situation.119 In addition to ethical pitfalls, there are also Constitutional
snags in its application.'
A milder form of compulsory removal, i.e., removal of organs at
death unless there is an objection, has been espoused by a leading commentator. 1 ' It can be suspected that as many people as participate in the
UAGA system to donate a part of their body at death will be obliged to
participate in this proposed system to not donate their body at death.
Consequently, although most Americans would not want their bodies violated at death (or they would be UAGA donors today), such violations would
occur as a result of their failure to object to the taking. Thus, this system
would be no better than compulsory removal.

Another system envisions the sale by a living individual of his body
at his death.' Such a system is faulty, however, since there are legal problems of adequate consideration which arise. What has the buyer received
for his payment? How can the buyer keep track of the seller to "collect"
his organ?
Although the final three alternatives all have some merit, they are
primarily hampered by two factors. First, they provide cadaver kidneys
to a potential recipient. As has been discussed before, cadaver kidneys are
clearly inferior in desired effect as compared to living kidney sources.
to
Second, since cadavers are used in these systems, they are subjected
8 This
"death"."
of
definition
the
of
issue
the
the raging controversy over
problem will remain paramount until a generally acceptable legal definition
of death is formulated. Therefore, the sale of kidneys by individuals who
will be referred to hereinafter as providers, i.e., those who are living at
the time they part with their kidney, needs to be considered as a potential
source of life-saving organs.

"'sNote, Compulsory Removal of Cadaver Organs, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 693 (1969).

119 Raymond, New French Law Makes Everyone an 'Organ Donor', reprinted in 4, No. 3
CNSW (Council of Nephrology Social Workers) Newsletter 36 (Oct. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as CNSW Newsletter].
120

Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 831-37.
at 837-42.
Body Part Sales, supra note 88 at 1218-19.

221 Id.
122

See, e.g., Discussions in Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 407-10 (1968); Leavell, Legal
Problems in Organ Transplants, 44 Miss. L.J. 865 (1973); Jeddeloh & Chatterjee, supra
123

supra note 104 at 264.

note 36 at 248-49; Weissman,
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THE SALE OF KIDNEYS BY THE LIVING FOR TRANSPLANTATION

A.

The ProposedPractice of Kidney Sales
It is clear that many individuals have already actively sought to sell
their organs. For example, in Chicago dozens of people have been calling
eye banks and kidney foundations to offer to sell an eye or a kidney."'
Why are these people being refused when the main advantage of sale
over donation is considered? This advantage is that by using living sources
all the disturbing attributes of kidney harvesting, such as determining the
time of death, getting permission from the next-of-kin and removing the
organs as soon as possible, would be alleviated. 2 5
A provision for the sale of kidneys could be easily incorporated into
existing federal law as will be shown later allowing remuneration for kidney
providers. Of course, payment would not necessarily have to be monetary.
For example it has been suggested that the seller could receive a paid up
life insurance policy,"' or receive free medical care for the remainder of
his life,' or "trade" his kidney to an organ bank for an organ needed by
him or his family, 2 8 in return for selling his kidney. However, it would
seem more predictable and just to establish a set price, e.g., of $5,000.00
that would be paid by the government to the individual provider. In effect,
the government would purchase the organ for transplantation. Five thousand dollars would be a good sum, high enough to provide an incentive fDr
providers and low enough not to be prohibitive economically, as will be
discussed later.
B.

Ramificationsof Kidney Sales by the Living
1. Ethical Permissability of Kidney Sales
Many arguments have been made by philosophers and moralists deploring the sale of human organs. However, in turn, many of these arguments can be dispensed with given the creation of a government-controlled
system where sales outside the system would be expressly prohibited and
sanctioned by strict criminal penalties. Therefore, there will be no unsavory
trafficking of organs,'2 9 the poor will not be exploited"2 ' and since payments
-4 Wertz, Transplant Market Blooms, reprinted in CNSW Newsletter, supra note 119 at 35.
125

Body Part Sales, supra note 88 at 1217.

'" Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 848.
127 Murray, in Discussion to Woodruff

Transplantation: The Clinical Problem, in TRANSPLANTATION LAW & ETIcs, supra note 15, 6 at 17.
I" Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 848.
129 Body Part Sales, supra note 88 at 1218.
10 Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 142, 166 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Dickens]; Freund, Organ Transplants: Ethical and Legal Problems, in
ETMcs IN MEDICINE 173 (Reiser, Dyck & Curran, ed. 1977) at 175 [hereinafter cited as

Freund]; J.

KATZ

& A.

CAPRON, CATASTROPHIC DISEASES: WHO DECIDES WHAT 197
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cited as KATZ & 1980
CAPRON].
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will be made by the government, everyone, not only the rich, will be able
to afford the operation.1 3 The problem of risk to the provider has already
been previously discussed and it was concluded to be minimal.'
Other theorists deplore the sale of the organs on the basis that payment
to the provider is repugnant. 3 It has been said that the body is not marketable' and that giving up a kidney only for the motive of financial reward
is despicable. 3' Experience has shown, however, that the body is marketable;
blood and sperm are sold for payment all the time."' The only difference
with a kidney is that it is not regenerative; however, it is not necessary to
have two kidneys. It is questionable, too, whether the only reason for a
person to sell his kidney would be for the money; even so, there is nothing
inherently wrong in receiving compensation as long as nobody is injured
thereby. Two final arguments against organ sales are not so easily disposed.
The first position is that certain individuals may be pressured into selling
their kidney"' so that the others would benefit from the payment. Psycho88
logical evaluations before transportation as described earlier' should weed
out some of these non-consenting providers. Also, sales by minors and
incompetents should be prohibited unless an informed consent is demonstrated and there is a guarantee that the payment made flows directly to the
provider. The court could hold such payments in trust for the minor until
the age of majority is reached. With incompetents, maybe the payment
could be used to provide care and maintenance for the individual.
The final argument made against organ sales is that potential donors
9
will be driven away once sales are allowed." Although this is true, it
must be assumed that many more "donors" will sell their kidneys if there
is a pecuniary benefit to be had. It is obvious that there are not enough
"pure" donors now to meet the needs of potential recipients, many of whom
are dying from lack of a transplant. Payments should also act as an incentive
to spur reluctant family members to "donate" a kidney to a loved one.
The overriding ethical consideration, however, is that life should be
preserved. " As long as the provider exercises his free will in making a
IsI Body Part Sales, supra note 88 at 1217, P. Simmons, Kidney Transplantation in TissuE
TYPING AND ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION (Yunis ed. 1973) at 165.

See text accompanying notes 49-59.
138 Dickens, supra note 130 at 165; Freund, supra note 130 at 176.
1s2

'3,Bowker, Experimentation on Humans and Gifts of Tissue: Articles 20-23 of the Civil
Code, 19 McGIL. L.J. 161, 182 (1973).
135

Id. E.

NIZSALOVSZKY,

A

LEGAL APPROACH TO ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION

183 (1974).

1'6 Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 847.
:"3 Sharpe, supra note 49 at 104; Dickens, supra note 130 at 169.
138 See note 95, supra.
"s9 Body

Part Sales, supra note 88 at 1223; Weissman, supra note 109 at 266; KATz & CAP-

RON, supra note 134.
140 Dukeminier, supra note 2 at 857.
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voluntary, informed consent to a minimal risk procedure in order to
dramatically improve the quality of life in a recipient, and even save that
life, the mere fact that there is a pecuniary reward given to the provider is
a mere ethical technicality. No public policy of the state will have been
violated.
2.

Legal Ramifications of Kidney Sales
a. Legal Standing of the Parties
Referring back to the legal positions of the parties in a donation setting,' it is obvious that sale, instead of donation should not impact greatly
on the conclusions made therein. For example, neither the provider or
recipient would have a cause of action against one another. Transplant
physicians could be liable to either party in two ways, by failing to get an
informed consent or by performing the operation in a negligent manner." 2
Perhaps the proposed sale statute could pattern some of the state statutes
mentioned earlier1" ' which make transplant surgeons liable only for negligence or willful misconduct.
With reference to the provider, truly voluntary informed consent can
once again be a problem if the individual is pressured into selling his organ
by members of his family or friends who seek to snatch the payment for
their own use. Furthermore, as described above, extreme caution must be
used when a minor or incompetent seeks to sell his kidney. In addition, it
appears that the same rationale described above'" to prohibit kidney donation from convicts should also apply in the present instance.
Finally, there would not be any threat of criminal liability to the
surgeon as long as he was performing transplants within the government
system. However, there would be criminal sanctions imposed on any physician, provider or recipient who attempted to set up a private sale without
the government as a party. Naturally, the same three parties could be found
guilty of criminal acts under a sales statute if a transplant was performed
outside of the established system.
b. Legal Dilemmas Peculiar to Organ Sales
i. Warranty and Strict Liability Issues
There are no cases which have considered whether the sale of organs
is a sale of goods or a service. If it is the former, there would possibly be
implied warranties under U.C.C. Sections 2-314 and 2-315 flowing to the recipient. Cases analogous to transplantation have considered this question
with respect to blood transfusions. Although one leading case "5 held that
24
142

See text accompanying notes 61-90, supra.
See text accompanying notes 61-62, supra.

143 See note 68 supra.
144

See text accompanying notes 83-86, supra.
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blood was a product and thus its purchase was a sale, the case of Perlmutter
v. Beth David Hospital14 held that the sale of blood was a service necessary
for a course of medical treatment. Perlmutter is regarded as the majority
" consequently, no implied warranties of
position in the United States;
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose should arise out of the
sale of organs either. The kidney would be regarded as a part of a treatment
service of transplantation. This majority position is further buttressed by
the existence of a few state statutes' which expressly refer to transplant
operations. These statutes provide that transplantation is a service and not
"9
a sale even if remuneration is provided.
The case law is less clear, however, with respect to whether a physician
6 0 Cerand hospital could be strictly liable in tort for transplantation.
tainly, the physician would warrant that the tissue is adequate for its intended use, has no detectable defects, is properly typed and has no disease.'
However, the physician should not have to warrant that the organ would
5
15
actually function and respond in the recipient. Once again, many states '
hold that blood transfusions are services and thus strict products liability
54
is not an issue. Furthermore, a few statutes expressly abolish strict liability for transplant surgeons and physicians. In summary, it would appear
that a recipient would not be able to maintain an action against a physician
on the basis of breach of implied warranty and strict liability. Of course,
an action based on medical malpractice, i.e., negligence, can still be maintained.
ii.

Tax Issues

Since the provider would be receiving $5,000 for his kidney, tax
ramifications are created. The payment could either be regarded as
55
ordinary income as compensation for services' or gains derived from dealings in property' or the payment could be regarded as a capital gain.'
In an analogous setting, remuneration from the sale of blood is re'" 308 N.Y. 100, 124 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
The Controversy Con"47 Wilde, Strict Liability for Transfusion of Contaminated Blood:

tinues, 12 CALrF. W.L. REV. 375 (1976).
48
'
See note 68, supra. The Illinois statutes were passed to overturn the holding of Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Il.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 896 (1970).
Id.
Body Part Sales, supra note 88 at 1255. Three cases held in favor of strict liability and
three cases rejected its applicability. All the cases involved blood transfusions. Id.
'5' Jeddeloh & Chatterjee, supra note 36 at 257.
149
150

152 Id.
'5-

Body Part Sales, supra note 88 at 1255.

'154 See, note 68, vupra.

1551.R.C. § 61(a)(1).
'"I.1C. § 61(a)(3).
257 I.R.C. § 1201.
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garded by the Internal Revenue Service as ordinary income. 5 ' Perhaps a
new statute would be needed to clarify this issue.
c. Federal Law on Transplantation-How It Can Coincide With
Proposed Sales
A new amendment 5 ' was recently passed by Congress to make improvements in the government-controlled ESRD program. Before the amendment, dialysis patients were eligible for Medicare payments to defray 80%
of the cost of dialysis beginning the third month of treatment and continuing
12 months after a transplant. Now in an effort to cut costs of the program,
"it is the intent of the Congress that the maximum practical number of
patients who are medically, socially, and psychologically suitable candidates
for . . . transplantation should be so treated."16 The amendment also
states that it is a "national objective" to maximize the use of "transplantation
consistent with good medical practice." '61 In order to help accomplish these
objectives, the new law continues benefits for a transplant recipient for 36
months after the transplantation'62 when post-transplantation costs are the
heaviest. 6 ' Most important of all, the new law, apparently in order to stimulate donors, provides payment to the donor "for all reasonable preparatory,
operation, and postoperation recovery expenses" 164 associated with the
donation.
Since Congress recognizes the importance of espousing the increased
use of transportation, it is conceivable that in the future a simple amendment could be made to provide for government-purchasing of human kidneys such as has been suggested here when the realization is made that not
enough kidneys are available for transplantation using current sources. As
it stands now, the new law does not disallow sales or the use of unrelated
living donors; therefore, a sale provision amendment could be injected
into the law and within days, non-related providers could be giving kidneys
while all their medical expenses would be reimbursed under the present
law. In summary, the current federal law provides an ideal framework for
a provision to allow for the purchase of human organs by the government.
3. Psychological Effects of Kidney Sales
Psychologically speaking, the recipient's mental health with respect to
a kidney sale should be no different than it was with donation. 6 ' For the
[1979] 14 FED. TAX COORDINATOR 20 (RIA)
J-1328.
Act of June 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-292, 92 Stat. 307 (1978).
''Old. § 1881(c)(6).
15
15

9

i' Id.
'wId. § 226A(b)(2).
163 S. REP. No. 714, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws

848, 856 [hereinafter referred to as

SENATE REPORT].

l64Act of June 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-292 § 1881(d), 92 Stat. 307 (1978).

165See bytext
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COMMENT

provider who is a relative of the recipient, familial pressures should be
minimized as a result of sale, and thus, truly informed consent can be
given by such providers. However, as pointed out earlier, there is a potential for pressure being placed on non-related living providers to give
their kidneys so that those who pressure can collect the payment. Hopefully
these individuals will be screened out in psychological assessment.
There is no indication that potential providers in a sale situation would
give their kidneys only for pecuniary motives. Even though providers would
be paid, they are still making a great sacrifice. Most of them should
experience the same rewarding feelings that their living related donor
counterparts experienced,166 such as increased self-esteem and the knowledge
that they may have saved the life of another.
4. Medical Ramifications of Transplantation from Kidney Sales
Since living providers are used in the proposed sale system of transplantation, many significant factors swing in favor of the successfulness of
the transplant. First of all, the best possible match can be sought for the
recipient using local, regional and national computer systems. If the payment incentive is effective, more providers will want to sell kidneys and
better matches will result. Normally, if an excellent match can be made
locally, the provider and recipient can be operated upon side by side.
Second, time can be used liberally in a sale situation. Medical and
psychological assessment of the provider can be done slowly and carefully.
If the kidney can be transplanted locally, no perfusion time is necessary
and no deterioration of the organ occurs since the patients are side by side.
Even if a kidney had to be flown coast-to-coast it would take only a matter
of hours since all the necessary preparations and tests on the patients
would have been done beforehand and the recipient can be on the operating
table waiting for the organ to arrive. Moreover, no kidneys are wasted due
to the inability to locate next-of-kin for consent.
Finally, since kidneys from living individuals are used and since there
is time to locate the best possible match, the prognosis for long-term renal
function of recipients should be excellent. Hopefully, the rates of success
will compare favorably with those of living related donors.
5. Economic Savings in the Sale of Kidneys
6
Dialysis treatments cost approximately $150.00 each. " Since most
patients must have dialysis three times a week, costs run approximately
$22,500 per year. The government's share through Medicare amounts to
$18,000 per year (80% of the total cost).
See text accompanying notes 99-102, supra.
167 Hartman interview, supra note 10.
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A kidney transplant costs between $20,000 to $25,000."e8 The first
year of postoperative care amounts to an additional $3,000 and thereafter,
89
costs average $1,500 per year."
These figures indicate why transplantation can be so cost-effective.
After three years the government will have spent $54,000 to dialyze one
patient and should the patient survive longer, the government's obligation
continues. However, after three years, the government will have spent only
$31,000 maximum on a transplant patient. Furthermore, at the end of 36
months the government's obligation to the transplant recipient ends. 7 '
The mere addition of the proposed payment price by the government
of $5,000 for a sale of a kidney would not greatly alter these figures. It
would only raise the final, maximum cost of transplantation to $36,000
as compared to the $54,000 it costs to maintain a dialysis patient for three
years. If the rates of successful transplants from sale providers can approach
the rates of living related donors (67% after three years), it is obvious
that permitting the sale of kidneys can save a lot of money especially
if the number of sale providers can meet current transplant needs. Should
current transplant needs be met from a sale and payment program, it is
obvious that the savings gained will far outweigh the payments since so
many less people will need to be on dialysis. Although the savings would
not be as dramatic with home dialysis, the quality of life improvements
in the recipients would be worth the cost of transplantation alone.
VI.

CONCLUSION

After consideration of all the factors that could affect the decision,
it has been easy to conclude that the sale of human organs, especially the
kidney, is not only permissable; better yet-it is desirable. There appears
to be no better way of reversing the paucity of organ sources, while improving the quality of life for the recipient to its fullest.
Of course, the sale of human organs could conceivably lapse into a
"Coma."'' That is why the time is ripe for Congress to amend the current
laws regarding transplantation to allow sales but only under Congress'
direction and control. In this way the possible creation of a cut-throat
competitive market system in the sale of human organs could be sabotaged
before it becomes the monster anticipated by anti-sale advocates.
TIMOTHY M. HARTMAN
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